At the turn of the 20 th century, state and local governments in the U.S. began to establish public employment offices. These non-profit governmental organizations match job seekers and businesses. One of the main objectives of these organizations was to protect job seekers from fraudulent activities by private employment agencies. In this paper, I propose a theory that describes malpractices of private employment agencies as a situation of asymmetric information between job seekers and private employment agencies which could cause adverse selection in the labor exchange market. The establishment of public employment offices can be viewed as a policy device to eliminate low quality private employment agencies that committed malpractices. I show that public employment offices helped lower the degree of asymmetric information. The majority of job seekers who used public employment offices were unskilled workers, immigrants or migrants who were vulnerable to exploitation by private employment agencies. I also find that the role of public employment offices was especially important for interstate migrants who were most lacking in information and networks in this new environment.
Introduction
Public employment offices are non-profit governmental organizations that match job seekers and employers.
1 One of the main purposes of public employment offices is to reduce job search costs in order to improve job seeker's performance in the labor market. As a labor market intermediary, public employment offices have existed in all OECD countries since the 1950s (Walwei 1996) .
Recent trends in European countries have been to deregulate and privatize the employment services since the 1990s (De Koning, Denys, and Walwei 1999) .
Interestingly, the opposite trend took place in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. The establishment of public employment offices was a widespread phenomenon in Europe and North
America. 2 Many countries also passed laws to abolish or strictly regulate private employment agencies (Martinez 1976) . 3 As a result, the labor exchange market was monopolized by the central government in these countries and this institutional feature did not change until the late 1980s.
In this paper, I provide a rationale for the establishment of public employment offices and explore the relationship between the development of public employment offices and labor market conditions in the U.S. in order to argue that public employment offices were effective in protecting job seekers, who lacked information and networks with regards to job search process, from malpractices by private employment agencies.
In the first part of this paper, I propose a theory that exploitation by private employment agencies with respect to job seekers resulted from asymmetric information between job seekers and private employment agencies. Uninformed job seekers cannot pay for high quality services because they cannot distinguish high and low quality agencies. This situation could make private employment agencies have an incentive to exploit uninformed job seekers (provide low quality services) due to their profit-maximizing behavior and thus cause adverse selection. As a result, the market may disappear or only low quality agencies survive in the labor exchange market. 4 In theory, it is possible that introducing public employment offices may eliminate low quality agencies that exploit uninformed job seekers, increase competition in the labor exchange market, and thus improve labor market efficiency. Public employment offices may remove low quality private employment agencies because low quality private employment agencies cannot survive if uninformed job seekers can use public employment offices without charge and without the risk of malpractice, while informed job seekers can use public employment offices or high quality private employment agencies. Therefore, no one would use low quality private employment agencies, which will cause them to disappear eventually. This implies that in the ideal case, the introduction of public employment offices can resolve the problem of adverse selection as they provide an alternative network to uninformed job seekers in the labor market.
In the second part of this paper, I estimate the number of job seekers using public employment offices as a percentage of the labor force to examine the development of public employment offices in the U.S. labor market over time. The data shows that public employment offices grew substantially and became a major labor market intermediary with the U.S. involvement in World War I. The use of public employment offices by job seekers as a percentage of the labor force was at least 4 percent between 1916 and 1940. This shows that public employment offices played an important role in the labor market, and thus could affect the behavior of job seekers and private employment agencies.
In the third part of this paper, I show that the majority of public employment office users were unskilled workers, immigrants or migrants in the early 20 th century. These workers were also major clients of private employment agencies in this period. This finding suggests that these workers, who were most likely to be abused by private employment agencies, tended to utilize public employment offices for their job search at that time.
Lastly, I test the relationship between the growth of public employment offices and changes in labor market conditions which were related to asymmetric information such as shares of immigrants, migrants, and unskilled workers. The key finding is that the relationship between the growth of public employment offices and interstate migration is positive and significant in most specifications. This positive correlation may support the hypothesis that public employment offices contributed to lowering the degree of asymmetric information for interstate migrants who were most likely to lack information and networks with regards to the job search process, and thus the most vulnerable to exploitation by private employment agencies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a theory of public employment offices. Section 3 provides the background of public employment offices in relation to the labor market. Section 4 presents the analysis of public employment office users. Section 5 provides the empirical work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
A Theory of Public Employment Offices
Labor economists have put forth theories about the existence of labor market intermediaries, which include private employment agencies (hereafter, referred to as private agencies) or public employment offices (hereafter, referred to as public offices), to explain why these intermediaries are necessary and how they help reduce transaction costs in the labor market (e.g., Pissarides 1979 , Yavas 1994 , and Kübler 1999 . The fundamental intuition behind these theories is that labor market intermediaries can increase the efficiency of the job matching process by reducing transaction costs in the labor market (Pissarides 1979, and Yavas 1994) . It has also been suggested that the coexistence of both public and private agencies may improve an employer's screening ability if there exists asymmetric information between job seekers and employers (Kübler, 1999) . However, these theories do not explain why public offices were introduced to restrain private agencies from malpractices with respect to job seekers. To understand this, I first describe how severe the abuses by private agencies were and why these were possible. Next I propose a theory of how public offices served to limit the incidence of malpractices by private agencies.
Around the turn of the 20 th century, in response to the cries of job seekers who were exploited by private agencies, social reformers and public officials tried to resolve this problem, one of which was to create public offices (Bogart 1900 , Sargent 1912 , Leiserson 1915 , and Herdon Jr. 1917 (Bogart 1900, p. 345) "One of the influences making for the rapid growth in the number and importance of public employment offices has been the flagrant evils connected with these private employment agencies." (Herdon Jr., 1918, p.5) The most common malpractice by private agencies was the misrepresentation of characteristics 5 Establishment of public offices is an example of a movement of Progressivism in the U.S. in the early 20th century because they were introduced to eliminate the abuses by private agencies in response to the cries of job seekers, thus this governmental intervention was a kind of social justice to help people in need. Stewart and Stewart (1933) , Edwards (1935) , Commons and Andrews (1936) and Martinez (1976) report that many European countries also established public offices to prevent private agencies from exploitation with respect to their clients. on occupations to job seekers (Commons and Andrews, 1936) . Sargent (1912, p. 36.) summarizes common deceitful practices by private agencies, which took advantage of uninformed job seekers in some of the following ways: In addition to these malpractices, several private agencies were found to have actually sent girls to houses of prostitution (Muhlhauser 1916) .
These abuses were possible because many job seekers who used private agencies were immigrants, unskilled workers, or temporary workers (Sargent 1912 The creation of public offices to provide job seekers with placement services can be seen as a mechanism to eliminate low quality private agencies, and thus resolve adverse selection which is caused by asymmetric information between job seekers and private agencies in the labor exchange market. With the provision of public offices, low quality private agencies may not survive because job seekers who are uninformed can use public offices without charge and without the risk of malpractice, while job seekers who are informed can use public offices or high quality private agencies. 7 Under ideal conditions, no one will use low quality private agencies, which will cause them to eventually disappear. This implies that the creation of public 6 Low quality agencies are likely to mimic high quality agencies if their clients cannot distinguish high and low quality agencies. For example, low quality agencies may charge high fees on their clients to imitate high quality service providers because high fees are usually accompanied by high quality services. This may result in pooling equilibrium if both high and low quality agencies signal to the clients. 7 An implicit assumption is that public offices are credibly of high quality because they are publicly provided. Even if job seekers are not sure about the credibility of public offices, they could be an effective response to solve the information/quality problem faced by job seekers because services by public offices are free.
offices can resolve the problem of adverse selection as an alternative network is provided to job seekers in the labor exchange market. Therefore, the introduction of public offices may inject competition that either causes low quality private agencies to improve or drives them out of the market. Throughout this process, high quality private agencies survive, and without monopolization of the labor exchange market by the government, both public and private agencies can exist together to improve the labor market more efficiently.
Besides the introduction of public offices, state governments began to regulate private agencies before public offices were established (see, for example, Bogart 1900). Some state or municipal governments required private agencies to pay license fees, deposit bonds, or both. In addition, several local governments imposed fines on private agencies or shut down their businesses when violation of the regulations was investigated. Baldwin (1951) and Bureau of Labor Standard (1962) insisted that before World War I, public offices did not function well and only the restrictions on private agencies were effective for the labor exchange market, but Devine (1909) , Sargent (1912) and Leiserson (1915) argued that the restrictions on private agencies were ineffective and the creation of public offices lessened the degree of malpractices, and thus contributed to protecting job seekers.
It is an open question as to which institution worked better to keep private agencies in check since there is little evidence of specific statistics and detailed reports to compare these two institutions. 
Background of Public Employment Offices
In this section, I provide evidence that public offices were a major labor market intermediary, and thus could affect the behavior of job seekers and private agencies in the early As the nation returned to normalcy, the use of public offices by job seekers dropped substantially. The USES, the central authority of public offices during World War I, lost its power over the labor market due to huge budget cuts by Congress, and thus a substantial number of offices were closed or turned over by state and municipal governments (U.S. Employment Service 1935a). The USES was a paper organization during the 1920s, meaning that the federal government's power over the labor market was minimal. Most public offices were maintained and operated by states or municipalities, independently of the federal government. In spite of the decentralization of public labor exchange, the use of public offices by job seekers was nontrivial.
Most research and documents ignore public offices' contribution to the U.S. labor market in the 1920s (e.g., U.S. Employment Service 1935a, Guzda 1983 , Commons and Andrews 1933 , Adams 1969 , and Breen 1997 . However, the evidence in Figures 1 and 2 shows that more than 2 million job seekers or roughly 5 percent of the total labor force per year used public offices during the 1920s. Public offices also made placements for 1.5 million jobseekers, approximately 3 percent of the labor force, in this period (U.S. Employment Service 1924 . Therefore, I
argue that the role of public offices was also important in the labor market in the 1920s. One might think that public offices played an important role in the labor market only during the emergency, such as World War I and the Great Depression, as public offices became centralized to resolve these chaotic situations. But public offices continued to serve as a major labor market intermediary in the 1920s, which was a time of peace and economic growth.
As the economy entered the Great Depression, the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 revitalized USES to be a nationwide employment service to control public offices across the nation. It was a joint system of the federal and state governments. 11 As a main tool to perform New Deal relief programs for unemployment, public offices were influential over the entire labor market during the Great Depression. The substantial increase in the use of public offices by job seekers in 1933 (as seen in Figures 1 and 2 ) is mainly due to the public works provided by the Civil Works Administration (CWA). CWA hired more than 4 million people and most of the placements for this administration were made by public offices. People who wanted to find jobs in CWA had to use public offices (USES, 1935b People who wanted to receive these benefits had to register with public offices.
One point should be mentioned about the two spikes (around World War I and the Great Depression) in the use of public offices by job seekers in Figures 1 and 2 , which is related to the argument in the previous section. During the periods of World War I and the Great Depression, high usage of public offices by job seekers is irrelevant to the hypothesis that public offices contributed to lowering the degree of asymmetric information between job seekers and private agencies. Public offices performed employment services for the war-time emergency during
World War I and matched job seekers and public work positions as a major tool to implement the New Deal policies in the Great Depression.
Given all the information provided in this section, it is clear that the impact of public offices on the labor market was not influential in the first two decades of its operation, but the importance of public offices grew substantially and allowed them to be a major labor market intermediary with their involvement of World War I. 
Users of Public Employment Offices
In this section, I analyze users of public offices to test an implication of the theory proposed in Section 2. The majority of job seekers using private agencies in the 19 th and early 12 The use of public offices by job seekers as a percent of the labor force was at least 4 percent between 1916 and 1940 (see Figures 1 and 2 ). 20 th centuries were unskilled workers and immigrants who were vulnerable to the abuses of private agencies. If these job seekers used public offices intensively, then it supports the hypothesis that public offices contributed to lowering the degree of exploitation by private agencies with respect to job seekers (the degree of asymmetric information between job seekers and private agencies) by providing an alternative network during their job search process.
Therefore, I analyze if those who were vulnerable to exploitation by private agencies, such as unskilled workers and immigrants, actually used public offices more intensively.
To do this, I present the gender and occupational shares of public office users. I also construct the corresponding shares of workers in population (the nation and state) from the Decennial Censuses to see how public office users differed from other workers in the labor market in the early 20 th century. 13 In addition, I show other characteristics of public office users to understand how they were related to the asymmetric information argument.
First, I construct the shares of public office users by gender for a few selected states (Connecticut, Missouri, and Illinois) and compare them to the shares of workers by gender in the nation and the corresponding states in the early 20 th century (see Table 1 ). For Connecticut and Illinois, the shares of female public office users were much larger than those of female workers in the nation and the states between 1900 and 1930. This indicates that female workers used public offices more intensively than male workers in those states. In Missouri, the share of female public office users was larger than both the nation and the state female workers in 1900 in the nation). The female shares in all cases (Missouri public offices, the state of Missouri, and the nation) were almost the same in 1930. Overall, female workers were likely to use employment services through public offices more intensively than male workers in Connecticut and Illinois but this was not the case in Missouri. Table 2 gives the entire shares of public office users by occupation in the selected states over time. One clear pattern is that users placed by public offices were biased toward service workers and laborers. 14 In Connecticut and Illinois, the largest portions of public office users were service workers while laborers formed the majority of public office users in Missouri (fourth, sixth, and eighth columns in Table 2 ). As time went by, the importance of "Agriculture" Connecticut, about 60 to 70 percent of applicants placed were service workers while more laborers were placed than service workers in Missouri (fourth and sixth columns in Table 2 ). The differential between service workers and laborers was not large in Illinois relative to that in Connecticut (eighth column in Table 2 ).
To see the types of public office users in more detail, I examine men's and women's occupational shares of public office users over time. The data show that male public office users were largely laborers and the dominant occupation for females was service work although there were some variations over state. 15 One clear fact is that the difference between public office users and other workers was not simply due to gender composition. Service work for women and common labor for men were the main types of occupations dealt with by public offices until 1930. Both service workers and laborers also made up the majority of private agencies' clients, who were vulnerable to the abuses of private agencies in the early 20 th century (Sargent 1912) .
Therefore, the intensive use of public offices by service workers and laborers supports the argument that public offices contributed to protecting job seekers from the abuses of private agencies, which means that the degree of asymmetric information between job seekers and private agencies was lowered through the introduction of public offices at that time.
Besides the gender and occupational shares of jobseekers through public offices, interesting facts are found in Wisconsin and New York public offices in 1901. Table 3 shows some characteristics of public office applicants in Wisconsin for 6 months (July -December 1901). About 40 percent of Wisconsin public office users were non U.S. citizens, 80 percent were single and only 5 percent were labor union members. Compared to workers in the nation, the portion of immigrants who used public offices in Wisconsin was higher by 13 percent. However, the difference in nativity disappeared between public office users and the state workers. This may indicate that the portion of immigrants using public offices was large because the immigrant share of the state workers overall was also high. The portion of single public office users was much larger than that of the nation or the state workers (about 80 percent for public offices, 46 percent for the state population and 43 percent for the nation). One prominent feature was that only 26 percent of public office users were Wisconsin-born (approximately 50 percent for the state and 54 percent for the nation). In terms of residence, almost half of the jobseekers who used public offices had resided in Wisconsin less than 5 years (see the last part of Table 3 ). Table 4 also provides information on public office applicants separately by gender. Overall, 62 percent of the applicants in New York public offices were non U.S. citizens (36 percent for the state). By gender, 52 percent of men and 68 percent of women public office users were non U.S. citizens (36 percent for men and 34 percent for women in the state population). Over 60 percent of the public office applicants were single and 4 percent were illiterate. In general, the share of single users were larger than that of the state workers but this inequality is reversed in women's case (the portion of female public office users was 62.1 percent while the portion for female workers in the state was 78 percent). About 60 percent of men and women were between 20 and 40 years of age (see the last part of the second column in Table 4 ). The common similarity between Wisconsin and New York is that many of the public office users were single around the turn of the 20 th century. In New York's case, it is clear that immigrants used public offices more intensively than native-born workers for their job search.
It is striking that 38 percent of public office applicants were interstate migrants (native born people who migrated from other regions in the U.S. to Wisconsin) and about 50 percent of them had resided in Wisconsin less than 5 years. Large portion of recent migrants among public office users also supports the argument that public offices helped lower the degree of asymmetric information between job seekers and private agencies because recent migrants from other states were more likely to be exploited by private agencies due to lack of information on the new environment. Even if the existence of public offices did not cause people to migrate to Wisconsin, I can argue that once people moved to Wisconsin, they were likely to look for jobs with the help of public offices if they could not rely on other networks, including private agencies.
In summary, most public office users were unskilled worker (service workers and laborers), immigrants or migrants in several states' cases. These types of people were also major clients of private agencies in the early 20 th century. This fact, in part, supports the argument that public offices provided an alternative job matching service for job seekers who were low-skilled or unfamiliar to new environment, and thus more likely to be exploited by dishonest private agencies.
Empirical Work
Theoretically, in the ideal case, the problem of adverse selection can be resolved as a result of the introduction of public offices if low quality private agencies are driven out, and thus asymmetric information between job seekers and private agencies disappears in the labor exchange market. Therefore, the most relevant empirical question from this theory is to explore if the introduction and development of public offices resolved the problem of adverse selection in the labor exchange market in the early 20 th century. 16 However, testing this hypothesis is hard because information on private agencies is rare and infrequent in the early 20 th century.
17
Instead, I test the hypothesis that public offices helped lower the degree of asymmetric information for uninformed job seekers. Even if this hypothesis is valid, it does not guarantee that adverse selection disappeared but tells us that public offices were directed to resolve the problem of adverse selection because lowering the degree of asymmetric information between job seekers and private agencies is a process of resolving the problem of adverse selection. This hypothesis was proposed in the last section and in part supported by the findings on the types of workers who used public offices. I extend this analysis to an empirical test by examining the 16 Throughout this paper, I frequently mention "lower the degree of asymmetric information" and "resolve the problem of adverse selection". Lowering the degree of asymmetric information is a process to resolve adverse selection because eliminating asymmetric information problem is necessary to resolve adverse selection. Therefore, when the information symmetry is achieved, low quality private agencies are driven out from the market, and thus adverse selection disappears. 17 To test the problem of adverse selection directly, detailed data on private agencies are required such as fees charged by private agencies.
relationship between the growth of public offices (in terms of the use of public offices by job seekers) and labor market conditions related to asymmetric information such as changes in the numbers of low-skilled workers, illiterates, immigrants, or migrants.
To test the hypothesis, a statistical model is constructed. The model describes the relationship between the use of public offices by job seekers and the labor market conditions which include proxy variables for asymmetric information. If the growth of public offices and the asymmetric information factors are positively related, then the relationship may support the hypothesis. The positive correlation indicates that the use of public offices by job seekers increased as the portion of people who were vulnerable to the abuses by private agencies due to lack of information increased. Hence, public offices contributed to lessening the degree of asymmetric information for uninformed job seekers who were more likely to be exploited by dishonest private agencies than others.
I collected data for the use of public offices by job seekers from the annual reports and monthly bulletins published by the U.S. Employment Service. I narrow my empirical analysis to 1920 and 1930 because most of the labor market data at state or lower regional levels are available decennially and public offices were not influential as a labor market intermediary before World War I (See Figure 2) . I also limit the samples of explanatory variables to working age population (age between 16 and 65 inclusive) in the labor force in urban area because most public offices before the Great Depression were located in important and large cities (Kellogg 1933 and Breen 1997) . 18 The regression model is as follows:
18 By definition, Job seekers using public offices are in the labor force and most of them are in the working age population. Various documents published by the federal and state governments reconfirm that all the public offices before 1934 were located in large cities (the author's inspection). 
The dependent variable USE it measures the use of public offices by job seekers in terms of the number of applicants who used public offices. The subscripts i and t indicate state and year (1920 and 1930) respectively. WAGE, EMPLOYMENT and INCOME are chosen to control for general labor market conditions. 19 For the data regarding the wage and employment levels, "Estimates of Average Manufacturing Wages by State" and "Total Employment by State" are used respectively . 20 To control for the level of income, I employ "The realized national income" which is an estimate that consists of "the total of payments to individuals by business and government in the form of wages, salaries, dividends, interest, net rents and royalties, and net profits withdrawn by unincorporated enterprises" (National Industrial
Conference Boards, Inc. 1939).
Other explanatory variables are selected based on the analysis of the types of public office users in the last section and constructed from IPUMS extract of 1920 and 1930 samples.
WOMEN and SINGLE are estimates of the numbers of women and single. The last six variables (DSE, ILLTERATE, IMMIGRANT, MIGRANT, SERVICE and LABOR) are proxy variables for asymmetric information. Immigrants, migrants, or unskilled workers were vulnerable to the abuses of private agencies due to lack of information about the area or less education in the early 20 th century. DSE is the number of people who do not speak English and ILLITERATE is the number of people who are illiterate (cannot read / or write) in any language. I add DSE and ILLITERATE for asymmetric information proxies because these types were less likely to be educated and thus seemed to be vulnerable to exploitation by private agencies. The variable IMMIGRANT is the number of non U.S. citizens; MIGRANT is the total number of migrants in the native-born, who are the U.S. citizens; SERVICE is the number of service workers; and LABOR is the number of laborers. MIGRANT is a measure of interstate migration which is estimated based on whether a person lived in the state in which he or she was born at the time of the census (Rosenbloom and Sundstrom 2004) . D t is a time dummy and X it indicates the interaction terms between time and region dummies to control for unobserved factors, in part, correlated with the explanatory variables over time or region.
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The summary statistics for the variables are shown in Table 5 and the results of regression analysis are provided in Tables 6 and 7 . First, I run cross-section regressions for 1920 and 1930 separately and the results are in Table 6 . Overall, the signs of the key estimates are not significant in most specifications. However, in all cases, the estimates for MIGRANT, which indicate the relationship between the use of public offices and interstate migration, are positive and significant. This pattern may imply that public offices helped migrants who were unfamiliar to the new environment and thus most likely to be abused by private agencies in their job search.
Tables 7 present the results for the unbalanced panel regressions with fixed and random effects. 22 In general, like cross-section regressions' case, most of the signs for the estimates are not significant. But the estimates for ILLITERATE and MIGRANT are significant but negative for ILLITERATE and positive for MIGRANT. The negative sign for ILLITERATE is unfavorable to illiterates but understandable since applicants of public offices must fill out application forms 21 The Census division is used for the region classification in this paper: New England; Middle Atlantic; East North Central; West North Central; South Atlantic; East South Central; West South Central; Mountain; and Pacific. 22 The balanced and unbalanced panel regressions produce nearly identical coefficient estimates.
when they registered and had interviews with the agents in public offices. Positive and significant estimates for MIGRANT are consistent with the results in the cross-section analyses.
Again, this positive relationship between the use of public offices by job seekers and interstate migration supports the hypothesis that public offices contributed to lowering the degree of asymmetric information, especially in favor of migrants who were most lacking in information and networks in this new environment.
Conclusion
Progressive Era social reformers viewed that uninformed job seekers were vulnerable to exploitation by private employment agencies. In response to the cries of these job seekers, public employment offices were introduced to restrain private employment agencies from exploitation of job seekers. I describe this situation as a case of asymmetric information between job seekers and private agencies, which could cause adverse selection in the labor exchange market. Creation of public employment offices can be viewed as a policy device to eliminate low quality private employment agencies which were committing malpractices with respect to job seekers.
My analysis shows that the majority of job seekers who utilized public employment offices were unskilled workers, immigrants or migrants who were also major clients of private employment agencies. One of the most interesting findings is a positive relationship between the growth of public employment offices and interstate migration in the early 20 th century, and this supports the hypothesis that public employment offices lessened the degree of asymmetric information in the labor exchange market. In other words, public employment offices were especially helpful for migrants who were most lacking in information and networks in this new environment.
In spite of the importance of public employment offices in the early 20 th century, current trends are the reduction of public funding and privatization of public employment services in response to the decrease in use by job seekers. 23 However, the role of public employment offices is still relevant with respect to asymmetric information problem in the labor exchange market. Autor and Houseman (2005) find that temporary help agencies jobs provide low-skilled workers with jobs that have lower wages and shorter employment durations than direct-hire jobs. There is a possibility that this ineffective outcome of temporary help agencies may result from asymmetric information between low-skilled workers and temporary help agencies. Temporary help agencies may have an incentive to make use of this information asymmetry to exploit their employees, which is an inefficient market outcome. 1 8 9 0 1 8 9 3 1 8 9 6 1 8 9 9 1 9 0 2 1 9 0 5 1 9 0 8 1 9 1 1 1 9 1 4 1 9 1 7 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 3 1 9 2 6 1 9 2 9 1 9 3 2 1 9 3 5 1 9 3 8 25.00% 1 8 9 0 1 8 9 3 1 8 9 6 1 8 9 9 1 9 0 2 1 9 0 5 1 9 0 8 1 9 1 1 1 9 1 4 1 9 1 7 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 3 1 9 2 6 1 9 2 9 1 9 3 2 1 9 3 5 1 9 3 8
Unemployment rate Use as a % of LF Sources: Labor force and unemployment rates (Wier, 1992) and Use of Public Employment Offices by Job Seekers (same as Figure 1 ). Table 2 . Notes: The second and third columns present the shares of male and female workers in the nation respectively. The fifth and sixth columns present the shares of male and female workers in the corresponding states respectively. The seventh and eighth columns indicate the shares of male and female job seekers registered in public employment offices in the corresponding states over the years respectively. All the shares of the nation and the states are calculated from workers who were working age population (between 16 and 65 inclusive) in the labor force. 
Panel Regressions (Unbalanced)
Note: Asterisks denote statistical significance as follows: *statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
